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Central ized 
Collective Bargaining-. 
U.S.-Canada Expérience 
Bryan M. Downie 
The author is concerned with bi-national bargaining 
which entails the délégation of decision-making power 
from Canada to the United States either through adhérence 
to a U.S. pattern or standard and/or through the actual 
délégation of decision-making power in collective bargain-
ing to U.S. officiais. This paper attempts to take an initial 
step in the direction of increasing our understanding oj 
what générâtes bi-national arrangements, what tactics and 
stratégies are involved, and the implications. 
Introduction 
With the maturation of collective bargaining attention has often 
been directed to the need for appropriate and efficient bargaining struc-
tures. That is, the emphasis is or should be on structures which can 
accomodate the goals of spécifie employée and employer constituent 
groups, provide for the inclusion of effective decision-making levels in 
the bargaining process, and préserve essential power relationships. As a 
viable framework within which money wages are determined structure 
merits that attention. 
International pattern bargaining is an extrême form of centralized 
decision-making and, therefore, directly related to the above structural 
issues. In this paper, the concern is with bi-national bargaining which 
entails the délégation of decision-
making power from Canada to the 
United States either (1) through 
adhérence to a U.S. pattern or stan-
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dard, and/or (2) through the actual délégation of decision-making power in 
collective bargaining to U.S. officiais. As is true in a domestic setting, 
international pattern phenomena can vary by agenda item. In any case, 
it is not merely administrative centralization which is of concern. Implicit 
in bi-national bargaining arrangements, even on non-wage issues, is a 
greater degree of control by U.S. officiais on the practice and process 
of collective bargaining in Canada. 
It should be stressed that in discussing U.S.-Canada relationships 
there is no intended implication concerning the effect of various forces 
and phenomena on the level of wages. The emphasis, in this paper, is 
on interrelationships in terms of processes and practices only. A further 
caveat is in order, as well. The paper draws entirely on a small sample 
of cases — pulp and paper, autos, méat packing, steel, and iron ore — 
examined earlier by the author for a period extending the mid-1960's. 
The limited number of cases examined and the qualitative nature of the 
data introduced limit the analytical power of this présentation. Just as 
basic is the question of whether the relationships and processes will 
remain the same over time and the applicability of the findings to other 
industries. In light of this any generalizations should be construed as 
tentative. The paper simply attempts to take an initial step in the direc-
tion of increasing our understanding of what générâtes bi-national 
arrangements, what tactics and stratégies are involved, and the implications. 
The paper is divided along the following Unes : (1) a synopsis of 
the major findings ; (2) the content and character of negotiations ; and 
(3) an assessment of bi-national bargaining. In order to set the appro-
priate background the first section brings together the results of the five 
separate case studies *. The prédominant pattern relationships are Conso-
lidated in table and conclusions with regard to the rôle of constituent 
groups (labor, management and the government) are specified and dis-
cussed. Attention is then directed in section 2 to the substantive and 
procédural conséquences of bi-national bargaining and some spéculations 
with regard to contract length and strike activity. Within the final 
section the reasons for and mechanics of bi-national bargaining are set 
forth. This has a direct bearing on the intraorganization and other impli-
cations of such centralized arrangements. The paper concludes with some 
observations regarding the assumed dangers of bi-national bargaining, 
1
 For more détail on each of the industries see DOWNIE, Bryan M., Relationships 
Between Canadian-American Wage Settlements : An Empirical Study of Five Indus-
tries, Kingston, Ontario, Queen's University, Industrial Relations Centre, 1970. 
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along with a few random remarks about international unions and the 
wage parity issue. 
A Synopsis of the Major Findings 
PATTERN CONFIGURATION 
The variety of expériences between and within the industries is 
apparent in Figure 1. There were mixtures and degrees of binational 
bargaining, each industry having its own unique characteristics and 
ensuing bargaining contours. The configuration of U.S. pattern influences 
varied considerably. The most complète form — expansion of the U.S. 
bargaining unit to encompass Canadian employées — occured at Mar-
moraton in iron ore and at Union Drawn in steel. They are owned by 
Bethlehem and Republic Steel, respectively. At the opposite extrême, the 
pattern in méat packing was divorced from developments in the U.S. 
Within this context, however, Swift Canadian patterned some of their 
fringes after those at the parent firm. In between, there were international 
relationships in the auto and paper industries through pattern bargaining, 
and in the central segment of the steel industry. Both U.S. wage and 
fringe changes were extended into the Canadian auto industry primarily 
after 1956, while in paper the bi-national relationship was predominantly 
in terms of wage changes. The manifestation in steel was confined for 
the most part to the timing of wage increases. On two occasions outside 
of the central analysis period (1952 and 1966), the U.S.-Canada differ-
ential defined the size of the Canadian increase, however. In addition 
to the Marmoraton expérience in iron ore, the mines in northern Québec 
achieved approximate parity with U.S. mines on the Mesabi Range and 
agreement at several mines was delayed in 1959 because of the U.S. 
steel strike. 
It would seem, then, that a stereotyped conception of what consti-
tutes bi-national influences escapes rigid generalization. Instead, various 
structures and permutations were présent. The U.S.-Canada relationships 
can be characterized as strong in paper and in autos (after 1956), fairly 
strong in segments of steel and iron ore, and extremely weak in méat 
packing. 
THE RÔLE OF CONSTITUENT GROUPS 
The next three sub-sections consider the findings concerning the 
rôle and policy of management, labor, and the government. The focus is 
on the bargaining process. 
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The Companies 
Collective bargaining theory places an important responsibility on 
unions in the spreading of patterns and in the case analyses this held true. 
It seems clear, however, that in cases where pattern relationships existed, 
employer policies as well contributed to the transmission process. At 
least some company coordination with U.S. negotiations was a feature 
common to each of the cases that entailed concurrent wage changes. The 
auto companies, notably GM and Chrysler, helped precipitate the trans-
mission process by the active participation of U.S. officiais in Canadian 
negotiations. This practice dates back to the 1940's. In 1967, the 
Canadian package by joint agreement was negociated by U. S. Chrysler 
officiais in Détroit. In the paper industry, there are a mix of company 
policies. Some U.S. subsidiaries were given broad discrétion, others are 
quite centralized. Additionally, however, as a clearinghouse of wage and 
collective bargaining information for practically ail mills on the continent, 
the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (in coopération with the 
American Pulp and Paper Association) fulfilled the coordination function 
on the employer side. There is an active exchange of information. As far 
back as 1929, Swift had coordinated U. S. and Canadian industrial 
relations policy. It has unilaterally extended some U. S. fringes to the 
Swift Canadian labor force. During negotiations Canadian officiais often 
had to clear wage offers with the parent firm. In steel, there was a change 
in effective dates for wage increases in order to conform with the U. S. 
date. It is interesting to note that this came at the request of Algoma steeL 
There was little local autonomy allowed for company negotiators at Union 
Drawn and Marmoraton. Lastly, there were a number of occasions when 
local management negotiators in iron ore had to clear wage offers with 
their U. S. offices. 
In no case when U. S. patterns were foliowed did management seem 
to seriously resist. Common bi-national policies seemed to be acceptable 
to both sides. A large international corporation may prefer to direct the 
industrial relations policy and probably increasingly so when faced with 
an international union. It is difficult to say whether corporate centrali-
zation preceded union pressures for uniformity in ail cases. Centralization 
on the corporate side, however, seemed to corne first. As noted, corporate 
paternalism at Swift goes back well before the entrance of the union. 
It was at their insistence that some fringes were tailored after their 
counterparts at the parent firm. There was apparently little corporate 
çpncern or résistance to the transmission of the Bethlehem pattern to the 
Canadian subsidiary. While the actions taken by the Steelworkers" execut-
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ive fostered and facilitated the arrangement, the corporation was an 
accomplice ; perhaps an unwilling one, although the évidence suggests 
just the opposite. The collective bargaining policy of the company was 
decidedly centralized prior to the pass-on and they agreed, without 
subjection to pressure, to use the U. S. agreement as a standard when 
negotiating the initial Marmoraton agreement. They agreed early in 
negotiations and as soon as it was suggested by the union. Although 
wages at several other iron mines hâve approached or equalled those in 
the U.S., the same type of System has not been agreed to, even though, 
U. S. interests predominate in the iron ore industry. Significantly, centra-
lized corporate policy was absent at those opérations. They are operated 
by managing companies or owned by a multiplicity of interests. 
There did not appear to be résistance in the pulp and paper industry. 
Indeed, during some periods prior to World War II, the Canadian 
industry had provided for automatic wage adjustments when a change 
had been made at a U.S. mill2. A discussion and considération of U.S. 
conditions, wage changes, and levels by the employers often constituted 
a major segment of Canadian negotiations. 
It was also notable that the first UAW breakthrough as far as inter-
national pattern bargaining is concerned came at GM — a company 
which follows a fairly centralized labor relations course in dealing with 
its Canadian opérations. Until 1964, the Canadian cost of individual items 
originally established in the U. S. were below those of the U. S. pattern 
because of lower base rates. Oral testimony by auto officiais in Canada 
prior to the 1967 parity agreements indicated a préférence for the inter-
national pattern following System. It is equally significant that the parity 
principle was initially established at a company following a centralized 
policy, i. e., Chrysler. 
On the other hand, while Swift Canadian accepted some bi-national 
uniformity in fringes they resisted any extension of the practice to other 
areas. When the union approached Swift officiais in the U.S. and requested 
the inclusion of Swift Canadian workers in the master agreement they 
were turned down. In any case, there are grounds for believing that 
employer actions and policies had a decided impact in shaping bargaining 
relationships between the two countries. 
2
 See, for example, Labour Gazette, Canada, Department of Labour, July, 1934, 
p. 701. 
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The Unions 
The international unions differed somewhat in the internai processes 
whereby demands were formulated and in their bargaining practices. 
The pulp and paper unions were highly centralized in their bargaining acti-
vity. The UPWA3 and the Steelworkers were more decentralized in the U.S. 
— Canada context. The UAW resided somewhere in between — demands 
were formulated in Canada and U. S. officiais generally participated 
in but did not lead Canadian negotiations. Certain features eut across 
union lines, however. 
First, demands were formulated in each union at individual con-
férences in Canada. There was just one occasion where there appeared to 
be a direct carry-over of U. S. demands before negotiations began. This 
occurred within the International Brotherhood of Paper Makers (IBPM) 
in 1946 4 . 
At the beginning of the conférence a few delegates from Pulp, Sulphite 
and Paper Mill Workers' locals stated that the International Brotherhood 
of Paper Makers had already submitted a program to the manufacturers, 
and thèse delegates voiced the objection of their locals to a program 
being submitted before ail the locals had had a chance to meet and 
to draw up a program. Vice-Président D'Aoust explained that the Paper 
Makers had just had their convention ; that the delegates from ail Paper 
Makers locals had already prepared their program at Columbus, Ohio, 
and that this program had been sent to the manufacturers. This came 
as a distinct shock to the Pulp Workers delegates. It presented a 
completely new situation. It was no longer a question of trying to 
reconcile two différent ideas. One of thèse ideas had already been made 
into a program and had been presented to the manufacturers. The Paper 
Makers stated that this program could not be changed. This was their 
program and it was ail settled 5. 
In that instance, however, the delegates from the IBPM locals adjust-
ed their demands to take into account the desires of the Canadian delegates 
from other unions. Otherwise, in each union the initial bargaining agenda 
seemed to be formulated by Canadian delegates. 
Second, U. S. negotiators participated in Canadian negotiations pre-
dominantly when Canadian firms exported substantially to the U. S. That 
3 The Packinghouse Workers merged with the Amalganiated Méat Cutters and 
Butcher Workmen in 1968 and are now entitled the Canadian Food and Allied 
Workers. 
4
 The International Brotherhood of Paper Makers was the precursor of the 
United Papermakers and Paperworkers. 
5 Ontario Newsprint Conférence, in the files of the Department of Research 
and Education, IBPSPMW, Montréal, Que., 1946, p. 2. 
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is, they demonstrated little interest in Canadian negotiations unless U. S. 
members could conceivably be affected by employment shifts due to 
Canadian compétition. The most publicized example which exemplifies 
the importance of the product market has, of course, been the auto 
industry. With the signing of the auto pact U. S. officiais negotiated the 
key Canadian agreement for the first time. This is probably an extension 
of UAW policy. They normally pursue the same collective bargaining 
objectives throughout a given product market. When U. S. officiais in 
the UAW participated prior to the passage of the auto part administration 
considérations seemed to be of primary importance. They entered nego-
tiations in the late stages and offered their expertise in resolving issues 
already on the table. They essentially played a « back room » rôle. 
The paper unions hâve been following a somewhat similar course 
for years in the primary paper industry. The pressures for uniformity 
seemed to be particularly embodied at the U. S. leadership level. The 
présidents of the Pulp and Sulphite Workers and the IBPM or UPP 
participated in a substantial number of Canadian negotiations. On some 
occasions U. S. officiais other than the above would participate. The 
international vice-président of the Pulp and Sulphite Workers on the U.S. 
West Coast chaired the B.C. negotiations. His counterpart for the UPP 
was also generally présent. They often led the negotiations for the union 
or played a commanding rôle. Through this process they pursued similar 
bargaining policies in the two countries. One reason was probably écono-
mie. One international officiai stated during negotiations : 
Compétition is an important factor as between Canadian and U.S. 
producers, as well as between east and west. The wage structures of 
the two countries must be considered and do hâve a bearing on each 
other 6. 
The available transcripts of negotiation suggest stratégie consi-
dérations, as well. The corporations argued that a pattern could not be 
established unless wages in other régions went up in a corresponding 
fashion. The following from 1950 negotiations highlights this type of 
interaction : 
I attended the Conférence on the Pacific Coast this year. The employers 
there hâve been condemning our unions because of the low rates we 
agrée to in the east. At the conférence this year they used me as a 
6 Ontario Newsprint and Pulp Conférence, Toronto, April 18, 1950, (in the 
files of the Department of Research and Education, IBPSPMW, Montréal, Québec). 
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machine gun target. . . I defended our methods of bargaining in the 
East, but they asked me what I was going to do about Eastern 
compétition 7. 
The policy of the USWA in iron ore was not precisely the same. 
U. S. officiais did the negotiating for Marmoraton Mines, however, and 
became involved in the late stages of negotiations at several other mines. 
They did this by way of téléphone calls from Canadian negotiators. Also, 
the Director of District 33 which encompasses the Mesabi Range, visited 
Canada in 1960 and held policy meetings with the iron ore locals. This 
may hâve been in response to pressures from U. S. locals which were 
concerned with Canadian compétition. Just prior to his Canadian visit, a 
letter from a local to the Director of District 33 read in part : 
Prior to 1955, whenever a mine was closed down permanently, everyone 
in the community more or less accepted it as being caused by the 
depletion of a particular ore deposit. Since then, however, attention 
has been drawn to the importance of iron ore from foreign sources, 
especially Canada and South America and of course some very justified 
suspicions hâve begun to take effect 8. 
The link between the letter and his visit is tenuous but the letter 
indicated the feelings of the U. S. rank-and-file on the matter of Canadian 
imports. 
USWA leaders hâve pursued a much less active rôle in Canadian 
basic steel. Significantly, the paucity of Canadian steel exports to the 
U.S. constitutes little danger to the rank-and-file in that country. At no 
time did they corne to Canada to supervise negotiations. This was also 
the case of U. S. officiais in the UPWA. 
A third aspect of union policy that was notable was the extend to 
which Canadian negotiators sought the most effective decision-making 
unit in a firm. In the case of U. S. firms, when labor relations policy for a 
Canadian subsidiary was formulated in the U. S. office, or at least subject 
to central considération, the internationals seemed to find it advantageous 
to deal with U. S. management. The exception was the pulp and paper 
industry, but even there U. S. control was of considérable importance to 
union policy. The basis for a bi-national union policy began in the em-
bryonic stage of collective bargaining, primarily at firms owned or 
7 Canadian International Paper Company and Subsidiary and Affiliated Com-
panies, Labor Conférence, April 26, 1950, (in the files of the Department of Research 
and Education, IBPSPMW, Montréal, Québec). 
8 In the files of the National Office, USWA, Toronto, Ontario. 
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controlled by U.S. interests. The important point is, however, that in 
many of the U. S. firms the policy makers are in that country. As a 
bargaining ploy union negotiators would approach thèse officiais rather 
than those in Canada. The UPWA approached Swift negotiators in the 
U. S. at one point because of their feeling that company negotiators in 
Canada did not hâve the authority to make décisions. The USWA 
approached officiais at Bethlehem and Republic to negotiate for Marmo-
raton and Union Drawn, respectively. They also negotiated pension plans 
for several iron ore mines at U. S. parent companies. The paper unions 
followed a similar course over the same issue at Kimberly-Clark. This 
strategy of seeking the most effective corporate decision-making unit took 
other forms, as well. The UAW by-passed Ford which set the pattern in 
the U. S. in 1967 and approached Chrysler on the wage parity issue. The 
relationship between Ford and Ford of Canada is more tenuous than 
between Chrysler and its Canadian subsidiary. 
A fourth feature that seemed to eut across union Unes was that, 
while the unions used U.S. pattern on many occasions as a standard and 
lever, they often demonstrated a capacity for compromise and flexibility. 
Union officiais in some cases acted as a moderating influence. In one set 
of Ontario paper negotiations, for example, a caucus of delegates was 
held to consider the employers' final offer. 
Vice-Président D'Aoust spoke of the effect the rejection of the offer 
would hâve on the other groups meeting next week. He also spoke of 
the lost time and earnings due to strikes in other industries. He asked 
if it was worthwhile to go through ail this trouble for $100.00 a year 
which was approximately 4 cents per hour for that year. It was his 
opinion that this was ail that we could get and suggested the offer be 
accepted 9. 
Oral testimony from company officiais in the auto and paper indus-
tries suggested that U.S. officiais, particularly, were somewhat more 
flexible. Wage parity demands by the UAW and USWA more often than 
not were given lip service but dropped. It simply was not feasible for 
the UPWA to press for U.S. standards and they did not do so. The 
Canada Packers pattern was established for the central segment of the 
industry but there were geographical differentials even at the major firms. 
Faced with well insulated local labor markets and a variety of marginal 
9 Minutes of the Conférence held with the Ontario Newsprint Employers at 
the Mount Royal Hôtel, Montréal, April 9, 1947, (in the files of the Department of 
Research and Education, IBPSPMW, Montréal, Que.), p. 13. 
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and expanding mines (the latter with very low labor costs), the policy 
of the USWA in iron was highly segmented and a considérable variety 
of wage rates were negotiated. The internationals over-all, therefore, did 
not seem to be overly rigid. 
The Government 
Government labor policy affected the practice and processs of col-
lective bargaining in two ways. First, wage controls during World War II 
were not lifted until 1947. They effectively prevented any tie-in with 
U.S. bargaining so that negotiations during those years were largely 
unaffected by U.S. developments. Additionnally, the structure of bargain-
ing was balkanized during those years because government policy, for 
the most part, provided for single plant représentation only on wage 
change requests. This helps explain the delay in the émergence of inter-
national bargaining arrangements until the late 1940's and early 1950's. 
After wage controls were lifted, the unions were first concerned with 
getting wages up and with re-shaping the structure of bargaining. 
Second, compulsory conciliation, particularly when coupled with the 
multiple loci of public policy in Canada, was a pervasive factor in nego-
tiations especially in steel, méat packing, and autos (up to 1956). If 
anything, it made a closer tie-in with U.S. bargaining more difficult to 
facilitate. It appeared to make the parties more intractable in many 
instances and caused serious delays in negotiations. Additionally, under 
some circumstances it seemed to play a négative rôle. 
Of relevance to this study is the fact that conciliation was ineffective 
or not used in the two industries (autos and paper) where U.S. standards 
are extensively used as relevant réfèrent points. The policy in the auto 
industry is well-known and entails circumventing conciliation to the 
extent possible. In the paper industry, it is the policy of the internationals 
and the companies to use conciliation as rarely as possible, both parties 
preferring to settle their différences without outside help. That boards 
rarely will accept U.S. standards for normative or accommodative 
purposes is clear from the expérience in the five industries. The one 
exception occurred in steel in 1954 when a board reluctantly recommended 
a 5-cent increase in the Stelco negotiations after a similar increase had 
been granted in the U.S. industry. This became the basis for settlement. 
There were other cases, however, where boards rejected the counterpart 
U.S. industry as a benchmark for their recommendations. Addressing itself 
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to this question the Ford board of 1954 stated : 
The true criterion must be the rate of wages paid in Canada in a 
comparable sphère of industry in a place where économie conditions 
are similar. 
The board appointed in 1953 to résolve the dispute between the paper 
unions and the Ontario Newsprint Group observed : 
We think it is unwise to attempt to use American précédents when 
examining wage rates in Canada for so many différent conditions apply 
that such a comparison is unsound. 
Thèse remarks are not intended to infer that their judgment was incorrect 
but only to point out that this position differed from that of one party 
or the other, or both. 
The Content and Character of Negotiations 
Over time there has been a large body of commentary on U.S.-
Canada bargaining arrangements. Unfortunately, the conséquences are 
difficult to pin-point in a définitive manner. In this context, nevertheless, 
as a starting point two particular aspects should be discussed. First, what 
are the substantive and procédural différences and, second, what are 
the effects with regard to the length of negotiations and industrial peace. 
Put another way, how does the negotiations process differ in substance, 
procédure, participants, and tone vis-à-vis a situation where bargaining 
is isolated or compartmentalized from U.S. developments. 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCÉDURAL ASPECTS AND THE BARGAINING AGENDA 
One of the conséquences of international bargaining seemed to be 
the introduction to the bargaining agenda of issues which would otherwise 
be downgraded or completely ignored for some time. Although spécu-
lative, in some cases the contract talks hâve probably been tilted more 
towards fringes than otherwise would hâve been the case. Benefits, such 
as the extended vacation plan, which were introduced during the U.S. 
automotion scare, had not been high priority demands in Canada but 
were transferred in any case at Union Drawn and Marmoraton. Fringes 
at thèse two companies departed in significant ways from the practice 
in the Canadian steel and iron ore industries and the variety of benefits 
negotiated was impressive. Moving allowances in the auto industry may 
hâve been another example. In addition to shifting the content of nego-
tiations and settlements, another aspect has been the introduction of 
U.S. wage adjustment approaches. The CWS program in steel and iron 
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ore, the annual-improvement-factor in autos arrived in Canada shortly 
after their development in the United States. Also, at times there were 
minor anomalies in Canadian agreements because of bi-national bargain-
ing. At Marmoraton, for example, the escalator clause was based on the 
U.S. Consumer Price Index. Where applicable, however, différences in 
the social security system hâve generally been taken into account by 
providing for différent offsets. O ver ail the substantive aspects would 
not seem to be particularly important. 
A major procédural aspect is that the timing of negotiations and 
settlements are affected. The attractiveness of U.S. settlements as a 
standard for Canadian negotiators was demonstrated by the timing of 
agreements and expiry dates in ail of the industries except méat packing. 
Again, among and within the four industries, a broad expérience was 
in évidence. At one extrême, the timing was précise by expandmg the 
U.S. bargaining unit (Marmoraton and Union Drawn). At the other, 
U.S. and Canadian expiry dates were generally dissimilar but with 
occasional overlap and a conséquent delay in Canadian negotiations 
while the U.S. situation was resolved. This occurred in segments of steel 
and iron ore. As an added dimension in steel, it has already been noted 
that the date on which yearly increases become effective was changed 
from March to August to concur with the practice in the U.S. industry. 
The auto and paper industries resided somewhere in between by provid-
ing for U.S. and Canadian expiry dates which were only one to three 
months apart. This dimension in procédures is likely to be unimportant 
unless marking time for U.S. settlements unduly delays Canadian settle-
ments or if économie conditions are markedly différent in the U.S. than 
Canada. The latter is generally not the case, the former is treated below. 
Another procédural factor much in évidence was the participation 
of U.S. negotiators on both sides of the table. This is the most widely 
critieized and probably the most important aspect of bi-national bargain-
ing. It is discussed in the last section. 
The Length of Negotiations and Strike Activity 
From an analysis of negotiations two notable features which involve 
the efficacy of the negotiations seem to be in évidence. First, there were 
lengthy negotiations, particularly in steel and autos, when there was no 
U.S. pattern to follow. Second, there appeared to be a greater incidence 
of strikes over non-pattern following issues. Table 1 summarizes the 
results — in méat packing, steel, paper, and autos — regarding the 
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TABLE 1 
Approximative Average Length of Negotiations {in Days) and Strike 
Activity, Key Negotiations, Méat Packing, Steel, East and West Coast 
Paper, and Auto Industries a 
Méat 
Packing Steel 
Pulp and Paper 
Autos 
East West 
Approx. avg. length 
of negotiations 106(6) 193(5) 80(8) 111(7) 148(5) 
Approx. avg. when not 
following U.S. pattern 106(6) 228(2) 60(4) 235(1) 240(3) 
Approx. avg. when follow-
ing U.S. pattern - 170(3) 97(4) 90(6) 87(2) 
Avg. length between U.S. 
and Canadian settlements 
when U.S. pattern set first _ 27(3) 103(4) 35(6) 57(2) 
No. of strikes when not 
following U.S. pattern - 1 - 1 2 
Length - 74 - 91 109; 148 
No. of strikes when 
following U.S. pattern - - - - 1 
Length - - - - 2 
a
 Figures in brackets dénote the number of observations. 
length of negotiations and strike activity for the key negotiations in 
Canada from the early 1950's to the mid 1960's. Sufficient data was not 
available in iron ore for a similar tabulation. A qualitative appraisal 
suggests the results would be basically the same, however. 
Any firm conclusion is limited by the number of observations. It 
is interesting to note, however, that negotiations were much longer in 
steel, autos and in the B.C. paper industry when the parties were not 
following the U.S. pattern or when one did not exist to use as a bench-
mark. In the paper industry in eastern Canada the opposite occured. In 
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cases where eastern paper firms followed the U.S. pattern, however, 
negotiations were not unduly long. The average length was approximately 
the sarne as in the méat packing industry. The shorter length when not 
following the U.S. pattern in this case is also somewhat misleading. In 
those cases the continental pattern was set in eastern Canada and nego-
tiations were very short. 
When following the U.S. pattern the paper and auto negotiations 
were shorter than the average in méat packing. Steel negotiations by far 
were the longest even when there was a U.S. pattern to follow. The parties 
in steel used conciliation in every round and this probably accounts for 
the longer length over time. The average length of time consumed after 
the U.S. pattern was set was only 27 days in steel, 35 days in B.C. 
paper, 57 days in autos but approximately 100 days in eastern Canada 
paper. On two occasions, however, negotiations had been postponed in 
eastern Canada paper by mutual agreement. When bargaining was re-
convened a seulement was arrived at quickly. 
In the four industries there was only one strike over a U.S. issue 10. 
This occurred in the auto industry. It concerned the issue of pension 
parity. The strike lasted only two days. In contrast, there was one strike 
in steel (74 days), one in paper (91 days), and two in the auto industry 
(109 and 148 days) over issues that were not related to U.S. substantive 
provisions n . The limited évidence, therefore, supports the view that, 
for thèse industries at least, following the U.S. pattern does not resuit 
in more intractable negotiations or at a minimum the results are mixed. 
Indeed, it could be argued that bi-national bargaining is a positive factor 
with regard to industrial peace. Certainly it is an aspect that merits 
further exploration and research. 
An Assessment 
A crucial aspect in assessing bi-national relationships is why they 
occur. The theoretical and policy implications are far différent if they 
resuit from joint decision-making rather than from unilatéral pressure. 
10
 This may not be quite accurate. There were strikes at Ford and GM in 1967 
after the key agreement was signed at Chrysler. Both agreed to parity but insisted 
on improvements in local work practices. 
11
 This does not include the strike at Stelco in 1966. While parity was a 
demand, the strike was not over that issue. Stelco had agreed to the parity principle 
early in negotiations. 
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Ross 12, for example, attributes extended bargaining contours primarily 
to union pressures. Wage patterns, so the argument runs, emanate from 
institutional variables such as common ownership, centralized bargaining 
and union rivalry which resuit in émulation to résolve union political 
pressures. 
The findings do not provide solid answers to the most important 
forces shaping collective bargaining. Both institutional and économie 
factors, the external as well as the internai environment, were important. 
While the existence of common ownership, centralized union policy, and 
union rivalry assumed prominence in some of the cases, other factors 
outside of the Ross construct are just as important in understanding the 
bargaining relationships. In three industries — autos, paper and méat 
packing — there was historical information available which goes back 
prior to 1940 when unionism either did not exist (autos and méat 
packing) or was not a major force (paper). In each of thèse cases bi-
national patterns were a fréquent phenemenon. It was limited to fringes 
in the case of Swift but there was uniformity in wage changes and levels 
in parts of the auto and paper industries. Laying aside the Swift expé-
rience for the moment, the underlying force behind concurrent wage 
adjustments must be contained in factors other than those noted by 
Ross and must be explained by more than unilatéral union pressures. 
Re-inforcing the pre-1940 data is the fact that there was little manage-
ment résistance to the pass-on arrangement at Marmoraton. In this regard 
I think it is significant that in the auto, paper, steel, and iron ore indus-
tries price détermination from the U.S. is a major feature 13. As is true 
of wage adjustments, American price décisions affect Canadian firms 
but in various degrees. The major U.S. paper companies, for example, 
hâve mills in Canada and price leadership affects producers throughout 
the continent. Major price décisions in the auto industry are, in many 
cases, made in the United States. For at least some producers the pricing 
of new Canadian models is done in the U.S. and, in between model 
years, Canadian officiais move certain lines by offering rebates to dealers. 
Canadian steel producers looks to U.S. price décisions as a barometer for 
12 Ross, Arthur M., Trade Union Wage Policy, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1948. 
13 Information on pricing in the auto industry was obtained through oral testi-
mony. For the paper and steel industries see GUTHRIE, J.A., The Economies of Pulp 
and Paper, Pullman, State Collège of Washington Press, 1950, pp. 111, 112; and 
Royal Commission on Canada's Economie Prospects, The Canadian Primary Iron 
and Steel Industry, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956, pp. 23, 24. 
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their own price adjustments. In some cases, list priées are identical. The 
fate of Marmoraton, and most Canadian iron mines, is directly tied to 
the fortunes of the U.S. parent firms. Almost ail Canadian ore is shipped 
to U.S. parent firms. Thus, even though there may not be a direct 
relationship, the linkage in the product market clearly would hâve some 
importance in explaning developments in the labor market. This, of 
course is something that Ross has downgraded. 
At various levels in the hierarchy of the unions it is true that bi-
national coercive comparisons develop, and largely where one would 
expect on a priori grounds. They were probably important in setting 
targets. But, the question of uniformity in the bargaining process hit in 
différent ways. It was never really an issue at Swift and only sporadically 
in basic steel. The reasons are difficult to pin point but a few observations 
can be made. Because of the dominant size of Canada Packers, and cor-
respondingly the C.P. negotiating committee, the Swift negotiations had 
a diminished function in union strategy. C.P. delegates to a large extent 
controlled the policy of the union and, because of its size, the union 
inevitably selected Canada Packers to set the pattern. Swift offered to 
take the lead in 1961 but the union simply took their wage offer and 
« whipsawed » Canada Packers. The resuit was that U.S. oriented de-
mands formulated at Swift were never presented. Historical and per-
sonality factors are also important. The Canadian branch of the USWA 
very early in their existence clearly established autonomy in their rela-
tionships with the Pittsburg office in ail matters including collective 
bargaining. This was by design and was always respected by Phillip 
Murray. As a conséquence American officiais rarely, if ever, visited 
Canada to supervise negotiations. In contrast, the practice of coordinated 
bi-national wage adjustments in paper dates back to World War I. John 
Burke, the perennial président of the IBPSPMW, particularly, institu-
tionalized the practice. He had unusual influcence with the locals, because 
of his guidance during the difficult 1920's and 30's. Following his death 
in the mid 60's participation of U.S. officiais declined. 
There appears to be another reason why the question of uniformity 
hit in différent ways. Each union has its own rank-and-file attributes. In 
the iron ore mines the USWA represents a membership widely dispersed 
by geography, one with a diversity of préférences and backgrounds and 
one in which there are decided différences in militancy from local to 
local. This had an effect on the distribution of the package, and the 
attitudes toward the international. A uniform program is extremely diffi-
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cuit to obtain even within Canada because of différences in tastes and 
culture. At the remote Québec mines, for example, the miners are prirtia-
rily interested in such benefits as long vacations and transportation 
allowances. French Canadian nationalism dictâtes against centralized 
control over negotiations at the Québec mines. Oral testimony indicated, 
as well, that a lack of militancy was another reason why the USWA has 
not pushed for the Marmoraton arrangement at some of the other mines. 
On the other hand, the membership in the auto industry is probably at 
least as militant as the leadership and, although différences in emphasis 
exist from local to local, they are a comparatively homogeneous group in 
both countries. This gave the leadership additional leverage, once they 
marshalled rank-and-file support, and facilitated a common approach. 
Centralized union bargaining did not seem to be an autonomous 
variable. Rather, control or coordination from the U. S. could be looked 
upon as an organizational of administrative reaction to other factors. The 
USWA présents an excellent example. It is decentralized in the U.-S.-
Canada context in the basic steel industry but centralized for Marmoraton. 
Rather than viewing bi-national émulation as the resuit of union pressures 
an alternative hypothesis can be suggested. Bargaining as Reder 14 sug-
gests, takes place within limits which are determined by the économie 
environment. Within this framework, both sides will use certain bargains 
as réfèrent points. They may use the same ones. For the company, firms in 
the same or closely related product market are likely to serve as the 
appropriate standard. For the union this is also a relevant considération 
along with the wages paid at the other plants of the same company. The 
important point is that the transmission process seemed to be a joint one. 
It has been stressed that in every case of bi-national influence the évidence 
was to the effect that U. S. standards were acceptable and assumed 
prominence for both parties. Their policies seemed to be mutually re-
inforcing for the most part so that a parallel process exists for both. 
From the point of view of the company there can be stratégie and/or 
administrative advantages in following an internationally coordinated 
policy. For example, head office policy could be upset and the firm 
« whipsawed » in their U. S. negotiations if the subsidiary follows an 
independent course. Or, in the pulp and paper industry, mills in various 
régions could be « whipsawed » or a particular firm could obtain a com-
pétitive advantage. There are administrative advantages, as well, in having 
14 REDER, M.W., « The Theory of Union Wage Policy », The Review of 
Economies and Statistics, Vol. XXXIV, February, 1952. 
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at least some standardization in certain contract provisions. The reasons 
for Swift's policy wish regard to fringes is probably contained in adminis-
trative considérations. Baker and France 15 list the following principal 
f actors favoring centralization of insurance and pension plans : 1 ) the 
sums of money involved and légal long term commitments ; 2) the need 
for the services of a specialist ; 3 ) the desirability of wide coverage ; and 
4) desirability of uniformity. 
The uniqueness or focal quality of U.S. settlements takes place in 
varying degrees at various levels within both union and company struc-
tures. It can be further hypothesized that the mechanics take the form 
of behavioral tactics which are a response, among other things, to the 
structural arrangements of the other party. The point has already been 
made that the internationals sought the most favorably disposed decision-
making unit of the company 16. This tends to be the highest unit and in 
the case of U.S. companies is located in the United States. The expérience 
at Marmoraton, Union Drawn, and the auto companies ail illustrate this. 
It also took place in paper but at a différent level because of the régional 
nature of multi-employer and pattern bargaining. The U.S. union leader-
ship took an active rôle in key Canadian negotiations — ostensibly those 
where management is most favorably disposed to follow the U.S. pattern. 
This was successfully carried out in eastern Canada in 1958 and 1959. To 
facilitate this strategy they also stagger negotiations throughout the con-
tinent. By so doing they can enhance the focal quality of key settlements 17. 
Therefore, neither side can be pin-pointed as the agent of pattern 
conveyance. Instead, the initiative probably cornes from both sides with 
the parties adjusting their structures in response to économie and insti-
tutional factors. The actual mechanics do not conform to a fixed pattern. 
They can take the form of shifting Canadian negotiations to the United 
States. Hère, de facto supervision from the U. S., which existed in the 
past, becomes explicit. Alternatively, U. S. negotiators can exert an on-
15 BAKER, H. and FRANCE, R., Centralization and Decentralization in Industrial 
Relations, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University,, Industrial Relations Section, 1954, 
p. 148. Others hâve also pointed out that a reasonably broad unit is required for 
some fringes. See Summer SLICHTER, James HEALY and Robert LIVERNASH, The 
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management, Washington, D.C., The Brookings 
Institution, 1960, p. 613. 
16 This union approach in procédural tactics has been elaborated by Richard 
WALTON and Robert MCKERSIE in A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations ; 
An analysis of A Social Interaction System, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 
1965, pp. 74, 75. It is important to note that Walton and McKersie indicate ma-
nagement may attempt to approach higher union officiais, as well. 
17 This tactic has also been noted by WALTON and MCKERSIE, ibid., p. 106. 
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site influence by playing a « back-room » rôle in Canada. Or, they can 
exert an influence in absentia as in paper through the employers asso-
ciation or as in iron ore through téléphone calls. 
The mechanics may, and the évidence indicates do, hâve repercus-
sions in the intraorganizational sensé. A movement towards centralized 
bargaining is typically the resuit for one party or the other, in some cases 
for both. The interests of local negotiators may be sacrificed ; their func-
tion becomes less important. First and second level negotiators may not 
see eye to eye. The most serious aspect of the wage parity agreement to 
Canadian officiais in one auto firm is the future remifications as far as 
their rôle is concerned. They see an évolution towards the complète 
centralization of the industrial relations function. Centralization at Swift 
deprived Canadian negotiators of their effectiveness and undermined their 
prestige with the union.18 Rébellion by the West Coast paper locals in 
both countries was partially attributable to centralized bargaining. Simi-
larly, some of Burke's activities, particularly at CIP in 1958 and 1959, 
caused local friction and dissension. There are advantages which may 
outweigh this. The achievement of U.S. standards may help the leadership 
résolve competing pressures. Nevertheless, one of the conséquences is 
that some local unions, just as local managements, may disagree with 
headquarters on important issues but be forced to accept uniform treat-
ment. Strong local unions may hâve a particular complaint if they feel 
they can do better outside an international agreement. Also, to the extent 
that on-site negotiators do not play as great a rôle, local issues may be 
de-emphasized and hâve later repercussions.19 Adjustment to local needs 
sometimes suffers under multiplant bargaining. In the cases examined, 
however, an area of local initiative remained in the day-to-day handling 
of grievances, the application of seniority rules, and so on. The locus of 
bargaining also varied by issues and in each case a local contract exists 
which is largely worked out by Canadian officiais on both sides. 
At the same time, as others hâve noted, narrowing wage differentials 
increase the emphasis on the level of work so that the effort bargain 
18 Canadian officiais not only had to clear wage offers with the parent firm 
but it, in turn, seemed to withhold information from Canadian officiais until the 
pattern was set by Canada Packers. As a bargaining strategy it had definite ad-
vantages in that they never had to set the Canadian pattern. This bargaining gambit 
is discussed by Walton and McKersie, Ibid., p. 316. 
!9 Reuther ultimately had to face this problem in the U.S. auto industry. 
Ibid., p. 374. 
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may take on more importance. 20 The auto companies agreed to parity 
but used the occasion to press for improvements in work practices. At 
their new plants in Canada, Ford and GM hâve insisted on the « tag 
relief system » that is prévalent in their U.S. plants, so that the assembly 
Une is not shut down during coffee breaks. In paper, wage uniformity 
could not be maintained for eastern Canadian mills without union conces-
sions on continuous opérations. 
It cannot be denied that there are potential dangers stemming from 
bi-national stratégies and pressures. First, it can be argued that Canadian 
sovereignty is threatened because of some extra-territorial décisions on 
the part of labor and management in the U.S. Second, a strike of North 
American dimensions initiated from the U.S. is possible where a conti-
nental agreement exists. The importance of both can be grossly exag-
gerated and the probability of the latter occurring is very remote. 
The first involves the presumed danger of issues being resolved 
outside of Canada by U.S. rather than Canadian personnel. The crucial 
factor is that collective bargaining is for the two most affected parties 
-— labor and management — unless an emergency situation develops. 
They must live with the agreement and are most apt to know the condi-
tions of demand and supply for labor. It can be argued that U.S. corpo-
ration officiais may be more sympathetic to union demands or, that in 
the interests of industrial peace throughout the corporation they may be 
more lenient. It is dubious to assume, however, that they will act irra-
tionally. They are in a better position to judge the overall économie 
position of the firm. Head office officiais in any case will probably hâve 
the final say even if Canadian officiais do the bargaining. 
While an international strike is a possibility, continental agreements 
to this point are very rare and the number of Canadian employées 
covered is relatively small. They are not in areas which could be de-
signated as public interest situations or where a strike would lead to an 
emergency situation. Further, the possibility is only of particular concern 
tô the extent that Canadians are striking over non-Canadian issues or, 
are ordered out on strike by American officiais against their wishes. 
Thèse are likely to be rare. A most important considération is that a 
continental unit can only last as long as it is found to be worth while to the 
parties. Without this ingrédient an expanded negotiating unit is not likely 
20 SLICHTER, HEALY and LTVERNASH, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on 
Management, pp. 620-21. 
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to survive internai, let alone, external pressures. To the extent that they 
do survive, presumably they are of value to the parties. 
Wage guidelines présent an additional dimension to the collective 
bargaining scène and, laying aside any considération of the wisdom of 
guidelines, the implications of bi-national bargaining should be considered. 
If there were guideposts in both countries, and making the unrealistic 
assumption that they are effective in the U.S. and that international 
pattern bargaining takes place, American guidelines would then be de-
termining some Canadian settlements. The U.S. guidelines would un-
doubtedly not be too far out of line with Canada's, however, so that this 
would be a plus factor. If there were guidelines in Canada only, then 
continental units and pattern bargaining could conceivably run contrary 
to public policy. It would be unrealistic to assume, however, that a 
Canadian union be any easier to influence through moral suasion than 
an international. 
Overall, international bargaining arrangements are probably a factor 
bringing stability and a greater degree of industrial peace to an industry. 
Officiais are located at the bargaining table, whether it is located in 
the U.S. or Canada, who hâve the responsibility, authority and expérien-
ce to break an impasse. Also, because U.S. standards possess focal quality 
settlements are likely to be arrived at more quickly. 21 At the same time 
the locus of decision-making varied with the issues under considération, 
a group of dissident locals in the British Columbia paper industry were 
able to break away from the Pulp and Sulphite Workers in the 1960's, 
the Abitibi Paper Company objected to being blanketed in a multi-
employer unit but successfully disengaged itself, and so on. The structural 
and procédural arrangments, therefore, seemed to accommodate the in-
terest of constituent groups reasonably well, but at the same time res-
ponded to the dynamic institutional and environmental features of parti-
cular situations. Although collective bargaining is somewhat différent 
then it would be, the différences seem to be of little real importance. 
The empirical évidence indicates that internationals do possess some 
advantages because of their U.S. link. Thèse can be grouped under the 
headings of available expertise, structural advantages when dealing with 
U.S. subsidiaries, and access to American funds. 22 The Canadian bran-
21 WALTON and MCKERSIE, op. cit., p. 124. 
22
 Thèse advantages hâve been treated in more détail elsewhere. See John 
CRISPO, International Unionism : A Study in Canadian-American Relations, To-
ronto : McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Ltd., 1967, pp. 211-13. 
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ches can draw on the expérience and research facilities of U.S. head-
quarters. A thorough knowledge of the policies, provisions, and profit 
position of U.S. parent firms is available to them on short notice. It is 
unrealistic to assume, however, that a purely Canadian union would 
function in isolation from their U.S. counterpart. Next, a Canadian 
branch has the opportunity of having certain issues resolved at the top 
level in the U.S., through international headquarters, when subsidiary 
policy is directed from that country. But any additional power is dé-
pendent on the actions of the U.S. membership and it is doubtfull that 
they would initiate or maintain a lengthy strike for their Canadian con-
frères. There is also nothing to prevent a Canadian union from attempting 
the same strategy by eliciting support from the U.S. Lastly, a Canadian 
branch may hâve access to U.S. funds to support their members on 
strike. Actually, there are probably only a small number of cases where 
U.S. union leaders would tangibly support a set of Canadian demands 
whose acceptance would require a strike of inordinate length. Employers 
may crédit internationals with more power than they actually possess 
due to the latter's large (real or imaginary) strike funds and the inter-
national link may give the membership confidence. Both of thèse are of 
doubtful validity particularly as time expires and, in any case., would 
be very minor advantages. They may also face some disadvantages due 
to their U.S. link. A purely Canadian replacement would, perhaps, be 
closer to its membership and able to develop the militancy of the rank-
and-file more effectively. The militant Quebec-based unions are a case in 
point23. 
At this point, a few remarks should be made about wage parity. 
From the évidence it would appear that the parity concept is a nebulous 
one and that great care is required when comparing agreements that, 
in appearance, are uniform on the two sides of the border. An assump-
tion is often made that parity will mean equal real income and identical 
wage structures. This, of course, need not be the case. The évidence 
indicates that where wage equality is claimed it is generally an attenuated 
version. First, wage levels were transmitted in ternis of domestic currency. 
Union Drawn provided the single case where Canadian rates were équi-
valent to the highest paying U.S. company when the Canadian dollar 
23
 Action by internationals in the political sphère may be of more importance 
than in the collective bargaining area. The UAW, for example, strongly supported 
the Canada-U.S. auto pact before Congress in the U.S. Similarly, the USWA has 
argued against the imposition of tariffs on iron ore. 
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was at a premium. To make exchange rate adjustments to Canadian 
settlements would hâve simply added another dimension and complication 
to négociations. In any case, the parties did not introduce adjustments 24. 
This would seem to indicate that the unions look upon U.S. levels 
as proper and sellable ones in Canada rather than reflecting a désire 
for equal real income. Again, administrative and stratégie aspects are 
probably paramount considérations. 
Second, within the more limited concept of parity in Canadian dol-
lars, it was not complète in terms of producing équivalent wage structures 
on the two sides of the border. Common labor rates most typically hâve 
been the ones equalized. Marmoraton and Union Drawn constitute the 
only cases where rates for each job class are the same as in the U.S. 
However, in both cases the wage structure is more compressed in Canada 
in that no jobs hâve been slotted in the higher classifications. The auto 
companies agreed to wage parity for ail jobs but there are différences in 
the cost-of-living bonus and complète parity is yet to be introduced. 
Finally, it was argued that wage parity in the auto industry would 
cause a surge in demands for parity in other industries. This is unlikely. 
There may be some increase in wage parity demands but it is doubtful 
that the issue will be seriously pursued throughout negotiations. The 
expérience in the auto and steel industries are cases in point. Despite 
autos' important position in the economy, it is even doubtful that it will 
be pursued where it had not been an issue before. It is not a new issue, 
but a recurring one and it has always been compartmentalized — one 
restricted to a few industries. The évidence in this study indicates that 
the same is also likely to be true of international wage change coordi-
nation. The future, therefore, is not likely to be very différent than the 
past. 
In conclusion, bi-national bargaining of various forms will be a part 
of the Canadian collective bargaining fabric in the foreseeable future at 
least. There are a host of unanswered questions but the following ques-
tions would provide an appropriate focus : Do bi-national pattern, or 
even domestic patterns, occur essentially because they hâve problem 
24
 The 1967 Chrysler agreement deals specifically with this point. The mémo-
randum states - « Wage rates in plants of Chrysler Canada shall be stated in 
Canadian currency, and wage rates in plants of Chrysler in the United States shall 
be stated in United States currency, and it shall be conclusively presumed that 
said currencies are on a par with each other - regardless of the rate of exchange 
at any given time or from time to time ». 
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solving value for both sides ? If so, what are the implications for dispute 
settlement procédures ? Does international pattern bargaining resuit in 
more efficient and less chaotic negotiations and is this an additional 
reason for its prevalence ? What are the intra-organizational implications ? 
Also, much more information is required on the employer side. It is 
clear that a much wider range of empirical évidence is required to 
answer thèse and other questions. 
LES NÉGOCIATIONS COLLECTIVES CANADO-AMÉRICAINES 
Le but de cet article est d'examiner la négociation bi-nationale impliquant une 
délégation de prise de décision vers les États-Unis, soit en suivant les normes amé-
ricaines, soit en déléguant effectivement la prise de décision à des cadres américains. 
C'est au moyen d'études de cas que nous avons précédemment complétées que nous 
tenterons de découvrir les sources, les tactiques, les stratégies et les implications des 
conventions bi-nationales. 
RÉSUMÉ DES CONCLUSIONS DEJA PRESENTEES 
L'allure générale des influences 
Il semble qu'on ne puisse faire aucune généralisation quant à la nature des 
influences sur les négociations bi-nationales. Bien au contraire, on s'aperçoit qu'en 
pratique il en existe plusieurs sortes. Nous pouvons cependant dire que les relations 
canada-américaines en négociation collective semblent fortes dans les industries du 
papier et de l'automobile (après 1956), relativement fortes dans les industries de 
l'acier et du fer et extrêmement faibles dans l'industrie des viandes. 
Le rôle des différentes parties à la négociation 
Il semble que les employeurs aient contribué autant que les syndicats à implanter 
l'usage des « patterns » en négociation collective. L'exemple bien connu des indus-
tries du papier et de l'automobile illustrent clairement ce point de vue. L'échange 
d'information et l'acceptation de politiques bi-nationales de relations industrielles 
surtout par les grandes compagnies organisées par des syndicats internationaux sont 
une cause certaine de cette acceptation par plusieurs de « patterns » bi-nationaux 
en négociation collective. 
Les syndicats internationaux de leur côté, diffèrent quelque peu principalement 
par la façon dont leurs demandes sont formulées et par les pratiques utilisées en 
négociation collective : soit que les demandes sont formulées à l'intérieur de chacun 
des syndicats à l'occasion de conférences individuelles tenues au Canada, soit que 
des négociateurs américains participent aux négociations canadiennes surtout dans 
le cas de firmes exportant substantiellement aux États-Unis, soit que les syndicats 
canadiens préfèrent négocier avec la direction américaine lorsque les politiques de 
relations industrielles sont définies aux États-Unis. Une autre caractéristique de la 
politique syndicale vis-à-vis les « patterns » bi-nationaux serait une certaine flexibilité 
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et capacité de compromis vis-à-vis les standards américains pré-établis. Souvent les 
officiers syndicaux ont ici une influence modératrice. 
Finalement on peut noter l'influence gouvernementale sur les « patterns > 
internationaux de deux façons différentes : soit par le contrôle des salaires pendant 
la dernière guerre, soit par la conciliation obligatoire, surtout dans les industries 
de l'acier, de l'automobile et des viandes (jusqu'à 1956). Ces deux éléments de 
politique du travail ont rendu plus difficile la coordination parfaite avec les négo-
ciations américaines. 
LE CONTENU ET LA NATURE DES NÉGOCIATIONS 
Une des conséquences de la négociation bi-nationale semble être l'inscription 
aux négociations de plusieurs points qui seraient autrement sous-estimés ou com-
plètement ignorés (v.g. certains avantages sociaux). Ces nouveaux sujets de négo-
ciation et le simple fait qu'on traite en des termes bi-nationaux ont grandement 
affecté la coordination (timing) des négociations et les dates d'expiration des con-
ventions. La participation de négociateurs américains des deux côtés de la table de 
négociation ajoutent une caractéristique à ce genre de négociation. 
Quant à la longueur des négociations et aux activités de grève, il semble que 
l'on puisse noter deux caractéristiques : de longues négociations en l'absence de 
« pattern » américain à suivre et un plus grand nombre de grèves sur des points 
qui ne sont pas sujets aux «patterns». 
UNE ÉVALUATION 
Il semble que l'explication fournie par Ross sur les raisons d'être des relations 
bi-nationales en négociation collective ne soit pas complète. C'est donc dire qu'il y 
a plus que la communauté de propriété, que l'existence d'une politique syndicale 
centralisée et que la rivalité syndicale dans l'explication d'un tel phénomène. La 
variation des prix sur le marché du produit, le choix pour le syndicat de négocier 
avec la compagnie la plus importante pour établir le « pattern », l'importance des 
facteurs historiques et des facteurs de personnalité et le genre de membership 
syndical semblent être des facteurs importants à considérer dans l'explication des 
relations bi-nationales. 
Cependant l'on doit noter les dangers possibles des stratégies et des pressions 
bi-nationales : la menace à la souveraineté canadienne, et l'éventualité d'une grève 
nord-américaine dans une industrie donnée constituent de sérieux problèmes sur le 
plan théorique, mais leur probabilité de concrétisation demeure très mince. Notons 
en plus que l'existence d'une politique de salaires dans un pays ou dans l'autre 
peut être sérieusement mise en danger par de telles conventions bi-nationales. 
Dans l'ensemble, les conventions résultant de la négociation bi-nationale sem-
blent être un facteur important de stabilité et de plus grande paix industrielle dans 
une industrie donnée. On peut prévoir la croissance d'un tel genre de négociation 
au Canada. Cependant, une foule de questions restent encore sans réponse. 
